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Net investment plays a crucial role for the economic develop-
ment of a country. It contributes to the growth of real income
and to the supply of jobs. Therefore, in view of sluggish
growth and rising unemployment in Germany, the government as
well as the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Council of Economic
Experts have repeatedly pointed out the need to promote over-
all investment. Looking at the share of fixed investment in
GDP in the German economy which is relatively high by interna-
tional standards the complaints about the weakness of invest-
ment appear to be somewhat exaggerated. However, a closer look
at the investment numbers published by the Deutsche Bundesbank
(1983a, 1984) shows that the structure of domestic capital
formation has changed dramatically since 1960. While invest-
ment by the non-financial business sector excluding housing
accounted for 55 per cent of total investment in 1960, it has
declined to some 30 per cent in the early 1980s (Figure 1) .
Investment in residential construction and public investment
have increased their share from about 44 per cent to more than
two thirds in the early 1980s. Thus, instead of using more re-
sources for enlarging and improving productive capacities, an
increasing share of domestic savings has been channeled into
projects the choice of which has not been made according to
private profitability but from the point of view of social
benefits. Among these projects are expenditures on infrastruc-
ture, public swimming pools, city halls, hospitals, family
homes etc., which increase social consumption but hardly con-
tribute to improve the competitiveness of the German industry
in domestic and in international markets.
Investments in new production facilities by German corpora-
tions have been disappointingly low over the last decade. This
is the more surprising since technological progress seems to
have accelerated since the early 1970. However, despite of ra-
pidly advancing technologies, of a multitude of innovations,
and of the emergence of new products investment in new produc-
tion facilities and in new product lines has been weak in Ger-
many. This indicates that the German economy has not managed- 2 -
to maintain its leading position in international markets for
high technology products. Since the level of wages remained
persistently high many companies found it difficult and often
even impossible to successfully compete with products from
newly industrialized countries. The result of this was a
strong decline in industrial employment over the last 15
years. The rate of unemployment rose from less than 1 per cent
of the labor force in the late 1960s to more than 8 per cent
in the early 1980s. The most recent German economic recovery,
which began after the change of government in September of
1982, had no effect other than to temporarily stop the in-
crease of the number of unemployed. Corporate investment acti-
vity, essential for enlarging production capacities and hence
for providing new jobs, has failed to improve noticeably. Al-
though business surveys indicate that profit expectations have
bettered, corporations remained hesitant as far as investment
plans are concerned (Industriekreditbank, 1984) .
Politicians as well as most commentators have seized upon the
high level of interest rates as the main reason for the poor
performance of investment in new production capacities (1).
The West German Government as well as other European govern-
ments again and again have blamed the large US-budget deficits
for the high level of interest rates and accordingly for the
weakness of investment and growth in most European countries.
However, how is it possible that the country which is said to
(1) This view has been emphasised by many economists. Large
economic research institutions such as the HWWA-Institute
in Hamburg, the DlW-Institute in Berlin, and the Ifo-In-
stitute in Munich came to the conclusion in their most re-
cent investigations of structural change in the West Ger-
man economy that the decline in investment activity in re-
cent years was triggered by the rise in interest rates.
The Institut f(3r Weltwirtschaft in Kiel and the RWI in
Essen, however, have stressed the low rate of profitabili-
ty as a reason for the sluggishness of investment. See
HWWA-Institut fOr Wirtschaftsforschung [1983], Deutsches
Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung - DIW [1983], IFO-Insti-
tut ftir Wirtschaftsforschung [1983], K. D. Schmidt et al.
[1983], and Rheinisch-Westfalisches Institut fur Wirt-
schaftsforschung (RWI) [1983].- 3 -
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be responsible for the world-wide increase in interest rates
and which is "suffering" from the highest level of real inter-
est rates, is experiencing a virtual investment boom? In the
US-economy, investment in machinery and equipment was about 24
percent higher in the first half of 1984 than a year ago,
while such investment had declined by 1.5 percent in Germany.
What is the reason for high real rates of interest to be ac-
companied in one country by a persistently weak investment
whereas in the other country investment expands rapidly?
Company Profits and Interest Rates - Determining Factors of
Investment Activity?
According to conventional thinking in investment theory, the
readyness to invest in new production capacities depends on
the relation of expected returns on fixed assets to expected
returns on financial assets (1). When the expected profit from
production activities rises (falls) in relation to the expect-
ed income from financial assets, then more (less) investments
in fixed assets will be made. Changes in nominal interest
rates, taken for themselves, do not allow any definite conclu-
sions as to the desirability of investments in financial
assets compared to investments in fixed assets. An increase in
interest rates that is caused by an increase in the expected
rate of inflation which is as strong or even stronger could
hardly have a favorable effect on the readiness to acquire fi-
nancial assets. The nominal interest rate must therefore be
adjusted for expected inflation. Only when this has been done
can an unambiguous indicator be obtained for the return on fi-
nancial investments, which is comparable to the rate of return
on fixed assets. This real interest rate is determined in the
overall economy by intertemporal preferences, i. e. by the
propensity of economic subjects to forego present in favor of
(1) Tax aspects do not need to be considered here, since for
existing companies income tax rates are the same for
income from both forms of investment, as long as the com-
pany concerned is in both cases a stock corporation.- 5 -
future consumption and by the expected return on fixed assets.
If the preference for present consumption increases because,
say, age groups with more lavish consumption patterns reach
maturity or because political parties with a strong preference
for present social consumption come to power, then the real
interest rate rises. Because of this, it becomes less worth-
while to invest in future production capacities, at least as
long as profit expectations with respect to fixed assets do
not change; investments in new production capacities decline.
The real rate of interest also increases if, instead of inter-
temporal preferences, the expected return, on fixed assets ri-
ses, because, say, progress has been made in production tech-
niques, new markets have been opened up, investment-inhibiting
regulations have been abolished, or distribution conflicts
have been solved. In this case the rising demand for invest-
ment capital assures a rising interest rate on financial mar-
kets.
Reliable statements on changes in the investment climate can
be made only if they are based on changes of the yield on
fixed assets relative to real interest rates (on financial
assets). The development of real interest rates by itself
allows a conclusion concerning investment only if the return
on fixed assets is constant (1) ; in the same way, an improve-
ment in profit expectations taken for itself can be interpret-
ed as an indication of more favorable investment conditions
only if the temporal preference for present consumption has
not changed. Whether either of these conditions holds is an
empirical question.
Return on Fixed Capital, Real Rate of Interest and Investment
An empirical investigation of investment behavior involves
considerable difficulties. For one thing, investment decisions
(1) It conforms with Keynesian thinking to pretend that the
return on fixed capital is exogenous. This, however, is an
abstraction of reality that makes these models useless for
the forecast of capital investment.- 6 -
depend to a large degree on expectations, which cannot be mea-
sured. For another thing, the investment expenditures that are
accounted for as net investments do not necessarily correspond
exactly to the volume of new investment projects. Statistical-
ly, those investment expenditures are registered as replace-
ment outlays that are necessary in order to compensate the de-
preciation on the capital stock. In an economic sense such
outlays can certainly include new investment projects, because
in a growing economy and over the course of time, certain pro-
duction locations will be closed down on account of unprofit-
ability and new production branches will arise. Conversely, it
is also possible that investment expenditures for the mainten-
ance of already existing production capacities at times exceed
the calculated depreciation.
Furthermore a large part of overall investment outlays is in-
fluenced or determined by other factors than by market-related
(relative) rates of return on fixed assets. This is more or
less true for the bulk of public investment as well as for in-
vestment in agriculture, in coal mining, and in residential
construction which are subsidized by a variety of measures. In
some instances the "profitability" of such investment projects
is determined by tax refunds and the possibility of deducting
losses up to a multiple of the funds invested from taxable in-
come from other sources. Expenditures of this kind may be
rather considered as a tax-induced reorientation of resource
allocation with distributional side-effects than as investment
projects based on market-related yield expectations (1) . The
national income accounts statistic does not distinguish be-
tween politically induced and economic investments. If public
investment is excluded the numbers still include investment in
highly subsidized areas such as residential construction,
agriculture, coal mining, steel, shipbuilding, railways and
postal services.
(1) This is not to say that investment in these areas would
not be undertaken in the absence of government interventions.
However, under yield considerations the size and the time pat-
tern would probably differ substantially. In this context it
is important to note that such investments cannot be expected
to be determined by market influences.- 7 -
Therefore, the analysis of the influence of yields and in-
terest rates on investment activity is based on data published
in the annual reports of corporations in the Federal Republic
of Germany. The data are collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank
and are aggregated for the corporate sector as a whole and for
certain industries. (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1983b).
Only those economic areas are covered by the statistics "in
which the bill of exchange is significant as a means of fi-
nance". These statistics basically comprise the manufacturing
and the construction industry as well as trade; the service
sector (including financial enterprises such as banks and in-
surance companies) is only represented in a few cases. The
gross income of the enterprises covered amounted to about 1.1
billion DM in 1981, compared to a gross value added for all
economic sectors of about 1.4 billion DM. Investments of
theses corporations account on average for about one third of
the investments of the non-financial business sector excluding
housing and exhibit noticeably stronger cyclical variations
than overall business investments. The survey primarily repre-
sents those areas that are characterized by a high intensity
of international competition and in which the number of jobs
has dwindled in the last ten years. Thus, this set of corpora-
tions is likely to represent approximately that part of the
economy in which market-oriented yield considerations are a
dominant determinant of investment behavior.
Because of these problems in calculating the economically re-
levant data, the analysis of the relationship between profit
on fixed assets and interest on financial assets on the one
hand and investment on the other hand can only yield informa-
tion on general tendencies, but not on econometrically precise
relationships. In any case the investigation can give some
idea of how these factors were connected with investment ac-
tivity in the past. For example, if it were to turn out that
there is a close positive relationship between profits and in-
vestment or a close negative relationship between interest- 8 -
rates and investment, then this result would be quite signifi-
cant for short-term forecasts and could help anticipate future
development of investment in fixed assets.
With the help of the data on the fixed capital stock that are
accounted for in the balance sheet statistics, the net invest-
ment of enterprises can be determined. For this purpose the
depreciation allowances for fixed assets are subtracted from
the capital stock. Annual net investments of corporations can
thus be obtained by calculating the increase in the capital
stock from the end of one year to the other.
According to the statistics of the annual reports of German
corporations, the book value of fixed assets (after deprecia-
tion had been deducted) rose 140 percent in the period from
1965 to 1981; this corresponds to an average annual increase
of 5.5 percent. The stock of fixed assets, however, did not
increase evenly during this interval; on the contrary, its
changes, i. e. net investment, show strong cyclical fluctua-
tions. In addition, it is interesting to note that the average
annual investment was considerably lower in the second half of
the period (1974 - 1981) than in the first, a development that
becomes much more evident when investments are adjusted for
inflation (Figure 2).
The gross income of the companies (annual surplus before
taxes) rose by 46 percent from 1965 to 1981. The annual sur-
plus (before taxes) with respect to fixed capital plus inven-
tories yields a rate of return on fixed assets that is often
used as an indicator to evaluate the investment climate. It
declined from 23 percent in 1965 to about 15 percent in 1983;
however, the decline of that rate is hardly sufficient to
fully explain the lackluster performance of investment in the
seventies and early eighties.- 9 -
Figure 2 - Net Investment , Real Interest Rate and Adjusted
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Source: Cf. Table 3.- 10 -
The "True" Earnings Capacity of the Capital Stock
The development of the annual surpluses shown in the corporate
balance sheets is not, however, a reliable indicator of the
earnings capacity of the capital stock employed in corporate
enterprises. Changes in the financing structure (relation of
net worth to outside capital including reserves) as well as
inflation-induced profits, i. e. illusory profits, resulting
from the required practice of basing depreciation on histori-
cal and not on (higher) replacement costs of fixed assets have
distorted the development of profit. While in calculations of
the rate of return the annual surplus is usually adjusted for
such influencing factors, it is nevertheless often overlooked
that the annual surplus is not obtained solely through the
sale of the goods and services produced by the company, the
firm's "natural" activity, but also through income from in-
vestment in financial assets and holdings and through extra-
ordinary profits as well.
In recent years enterprises in Germany have proceeded to in-
vest more of their financial means in short- and long-term fi-
nancial assets as well as in holdings. According to the sta-
tistics of the annual statements of enterprises published by
the Bundesbank, the balance sheet items "financial invest-
ments" and "holdings" increased almost four-fold from 1965 to
1981, while the stock of fixed assets - i. e. the capital em-
ployed for actual production - rose by only 2 1/2 times
[Deutsche Bundesbank, 1983]. Investments in financial assets
and holdings yield revenues on a regular basis, which -
together with extraordinary profits (from, say, the sale of
real estate that has gone up in value) - contribute to gross
corporate income. In recent years these sources have gained
considerable significance for profits. These revenues can be
regarded as sunk yields and therefore they do not influence
present investment decisions.
In order to gain a more accurate picture of the development of
the return on fixed assets, the annual surplus has been broken
down into its components: ordinary operating earnings and- 11 -
earnings that are neutral with respect to production. The neu-
tral earnings are made up of interest returns and "other re-
turns" of the companies (revenues from holdings, from the re-
lease or reduction of reserves or valuation adjustments as
well as from losses and gains in capital assets) less neutral
outlays. The balance sheet statistics of the Bundesbank do not
show the neutral outlay. However, the costs of realizing these
revenues are as a rule negligible. For example, for 59 busi-
ness concerns that are required to publish their annual state-
ments of assets and liabilities and which have a total annual
turnover of about 100 billion DM, the cost amounted on average
to 10 per cent of the neutral earnings for the years 1980 and
1981 [Statistisches Bundesamt, 1984]. Consideration of these
costs would affect only the level of neutral earnings, but not
the change in the revenue structure, which is what matters
here.
In order to gain an approximation for the actual earning capa-
city of fixed assets, the annual surplus first has to be ad-
justed for influences that result from changes in the finan-
cial structure. For this purpose the surplus was increased by
the amount of the interest expenditure (gross return = annual
surplus before taxes plus interest payments on borrowed capi-
tal) . If the neutral earnings are subsequently subtracted from
the gross return, then a considerable change in the revenue
structure becomes evident: while the neutral earnings contri-
buted a scant third of returns in the mid-1960s, they com-
prised almost two thirds of returns in 1981 (Table 1) . Thus,
production as a source of corporate profits became less and
less important; ultimately, profits were realized for the most
part through outside activities. The shift in the revenue
structure was especially blatant in the mid-1970s, when the
weakness of corporate investments also began.
If one examines the development according to individual busi-
ness branches, it is remarkable that the revenue structure was
relatively uniform in 1965. After that, the contribution of
operational revenues to gross revenues decreased everywhere,12
Table 1 - Share of Ordinary Operating Earnings in Gross Yield for Selected
West German Industries (per cent)
Manufacturing - total
Chemicals
Manufacture of plastic products
Extraction and processing of
stones and earthern goods
Iron and steel processing industry
Non-ferrous metals



































































































































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Jahresabschlusse der Unternehmen in der Bundes-
republik Deutschland 1965-1981, Special Publication No. 5 of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt 1983; own calculations.BihUothek da. hxmmm
ni? Wdtwirtsdiaft Kfel
- 13 -
but with considerable differences from industry to industry.
The share of ordinary operating earnings in gross revenue de-
creased more than on average in electrical engineering, in
non-ferrous metal production and predictably, in the iron and
steel industry. In the last two cases there were even operat-
ing losses at the beginning of the 1980s. In contrast to
these, the share of operational revenues in the woodprocessing
industry, in apparel and in retail trade remained relatively
high. The shift of the revenue structure at the expense of the
earnings realized in production in the classic German export
branches of mechanical engineering and road vehicle construc-
tion is also noteworthy. Of course, this still says nothing
about the present level of returns on fixed assets, however,
the deterioration is striking.
For a comparison of yields on financial assets with return on
fixed assets some balance sheet adjustments are required. It
is necessary to correct the values for real estate, buildings,
and machinery that are shown in the aggregate balance sheet.
This is because durable goods are shown in the balance state-
ment at their respective purchasing prices, diminished by de-
preciation. However, in an inflationary environment, the re-
placement prices for a certain capital good surpass the orig-
inal purchase prices. In order to take this effect into con-
sideration, the book values of the capital assets were in-
flated (1). Inventories were added to the capital assets at
(1) The inflator was calculated as follows: the capital stock
indicated in the national income accounts of the Federal
Statistical Office for the entrepreneurial sector (exclud-
ing housing at replacement prices were put in proportion
to the capital assets at original purchase prices. The
book value of fixed assets in the aggregate corporate ba-
lance sheet was multiplied by this ratio.
(2) Note that this rate of return has not been adjusted for
illusory profits; thus it overstates the "true" profit-
rate.- 14 -
replacement prices. If ordinary operating earnings are divided
by the capital stock thus calculated, one obtains a rough in-
dicator for the current rate of return of fixed assets (2) .
The rates of return for various industries are shown in
Table 2. It becomes evident that the rates of return, which -
except for the steel industry - were between 10 and 20 per
cent in the mid-1960s, declined considerably in the course of
the 1970s.
In 1981 there were only six industries in which the rates of
return were higher than the real rate of interest on fixed-in-
terest-bearing securities. These include the woodprocessing,
apparel, food and construction industries, as well as whole-
sale and retail trade, all of them industries which,, are ex-
posed only slightly to international competition, either be-
cause of high transportation costs or because of protection
from cheaper imports. Two industries even operated with pro-
duction losses: steel and non-ferrous metals. The decline in
returns is noteworthy in those capital goods industries which
are believed to enjoy locational advantages in West Germany:
mechanical engineering and road vehicle construction.
The decline of the rate of return was accompanied by a notice-
able reduction of investment outlays. In order not to distort
the picture by the development in individual years the average
annual rates of returns and net investment outlays have been
compared in Table 3 for medium term periods (the years from
1966 to 1973 and from 1974 to 1981) . The table shows substan-
tially lower numbers for both variables in the latter period.
For about one half of the industries selected the rate of re-
turn was more than 50 per cent lower in the 1974 to 1981-pe-
riod than from 1966 to 1973. In the iron and steel processing
industry and in the non-ferrous metals industry the average
annual rate of return was even negative from 1974 to 1981. The
reduction of investment outlays was more pronounced than that
of profits. In some industries (stone extraction and pro-
cessing, non-ferrous metals, textile industry, and clothing
industry) investments were not sufficient to cover replacement
needs; production capacities shrank.-. 1.5 -
Table 2 - Rates of Return on Tangible Assets in West German Industries
(per cent)
Chemicals
Manufacture of plastic products
Stone extraction and processing
Iron and steel processing industry
Non-ferrous metals


















































































































Source; Cf. Table 1; Federal Statistical Office, Fachserie 18. Volkswirt-
schaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Reihe 5: Revidierte Ergebnisse 1960 bis
1982, Stuttgart 1983; own calculations.- 16 -
Table 3 - Rates of Return on Tangible Assets and Net Investment in West German
Industries (per cent and Millions of DM)
Chemicals
Manufacture of plasticproducts
Stone extraction and processing
Iron and steel processing industry
Non-ferrous metals





































































































Source: Cf. Table 1; Federal Statistical Office, Fachserie 18. Volkswirtschaft-
liche Gesamtrechnungen, Reihe 5: Revidierte Ergebnisse 1960 bis 1982,
Stuttgart 1983; own calculations.- 17 -
While in all industries analyzed in this paper there was a re-
duction of the rate of return as well as of net investments,
the reduction was by no means proportional or uniform for
different industries. Figure 3 shows the percentage decline of
the average annual rate of return and of investment. In most
industries the fall of investment outlays was much stronger
than the deterioration of the profit rates (as measured in per
cent of the average annual figures of the period from 1966 to
1973). An outstanding case is the clothing industry which
managed to keep the rate of return at a relatively high level
but cut investments drastically. Some industries, namely iron
and steel processing and electrical engineering, suffered re-
latively large reduction of profits but refrained from cur-
tailing investments correspondingly. The difference of the re-
action of selected industries to the fall of the rate of re-
turn is probably due to differences in the exposure of indus-
tries to international competition, in the expected ability of
the industry to improve profits by additional investments, and
in the amount of subsidies (often granted for investment pur-
poses) collected by individual industries. An anlysis of these
influences goes beyond the scope of this study which is based
on balance sheet data. Thus, although there is clear evidence
on the significance of yields for net investments, further
analysis is required in order to explain the investment be-
havior of individual industries.
The rate of return ought to be adjusted for the inflation-in-
duced illusory profit which arises because depreciation on
fixed assets (machinery and buildings) is understated due to
legal regulations which do only allow depreciation from the
purchasing price. This illusory profit can be determined for
all industries together and is shown in Table 4. If neutral
returns and illusory profits are deducted from gross yields,
then one obtains an approximate value for the ordinary operat-
ing earnings of German corporate enterprises, i. e. for the
annual surplus (before taxes and including interest expendi-
tures) that is realized within the framework of actual produc-
tion operations. Ordinary operating earnings in relation to
fixed assets at replacement prices yield the real return rate
of fixed assets.- 18 -
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Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1983b).-Own calculations.- 19 -
This real rate of return (before taxes) declined from about 14
percent in 1966 to 4 percent in 1981 [Dicke, Trapp, 1984].
This represents a much greater loss of earning capacity than
is suggested by the changes in entrepreneurial profits as
shown in the balance sheets. If one compares the rate of re-
turn on fixed assets to the real interest on financial assets
(Table 4), then it becomes apparent that investments in fixed
assets lost more and more of their appeal in the 1970s. At the
beginning of the 1980s the yield on investments in financial
markets was - despite low risks - even higher than the yield
on investments in productive assets. An estimation of the real
rates of return for the years 1982/1983 by means of prelimi-
nary results of the national income accounts and own calcula-
tions, shows that the earning capacity of fixed assets has not
markedly improved of late. According to an analysis of the ag-
gregated balance sheet of 857 companies, which was carried out
by the Industriekreditbank [1984], investment in fixed capital
remained weak in 1983; however, holdings of financial assets
continued to rise strongly (1).
These data can admittedly only give a rough idea about the
"true" return on the capital invested in fixed assets. How-
ever, despite the inaccuracy of individual data, there can be
no doubt about the change of profits and returns. The calcu-
lations show that entrepreneurial profits were realized in re-
cent years more and more through outside activities. The com-
panies were no longer able to earn the risk bonus necessary
for investment projects.
Production Profitability Must be Restored
Although (or also because) the federal government and the go-
vernments of the individual Lander have strongly increased
subsidies to support corporations and rescue jobs in the
1970s, the yield differential in favor of investments in fixed
assets, which had amounted to 8 percentage points in the
(1) A continuation of this trend in the 1st. half of 1984 is
reported by the Deutsche Bundesbank [1984].- 20 -























































































Annual surplus plus interest expenditures.
2 Interest revenues and other revenues












































































AfaW = depreciations at replacement prices, AfaA = depreciations at purchase prices,
sector (without apartment rental according to the NIA) and b = corporations included
balance sheet statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Gross yield minus illusory profit and neutral yield.
Ordinary operating earnings in per cent of fixed
Adjusted yield on fixed assets minus
securities less the increase in the
7 Yield on
•Estimated
bonds outstanding less the
values.


























real interest (circulation yield on fixed-interest-bearing
GNP deflator).
increase in the GNP deflator.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, JahresabschlOsse der Unternehmen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1965
bis 1981, Special Publication No. 5 of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt 1983. - Federal
Statistical Office, Fachserie 18: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen, Reihe 5: Revidierte
Ergebnisse 1960 bis 1982, Stuttgart 1983. - German Council of Experts for the Appraisement
of the Overall Economic Development, Ein Schritt voran, Jahresgutachten 1983/84, Bonn 1983.
- Own calculations.- 21 -
1960s, dwindled from the mid-1970s on to about 2 percentage
points. It is above all this decline of the yield on fixed
assets that is responsible for the weakness of investment that
has persisted since 1974.
Since this is for the most part not wholly realized, other
factors are mentioned as reasons for the low propensity to in-
vest, e. g. , the high-interest policy of the US, lack of new
investment projects, exessive burdens on private enterprises
through research and investment expenditures for new technolo-
gies and products, or simply an investment strike. In fact
there is no lack of new investment projects. Also, companies
were ready and able to take on such projects if the price
relations were favorable. But a rising cost pressure and an
ever decreasing flexibility in production due to restrictive
employment regulations (Spinanger, 1983) have had the result
that more and moire projects are not profitable within Germany
and are carried out abroad instead. The average annual in-
crease of German direct investment abroad amounted to about 12
per cent from 1974 to 1981, whereas corporate investment (at
current prices) increased at an annual rate of about 4 per
cent.
The government has contributed considerably to this situation.
It increased the burden on companies significantly by additio-
nal wage costs (social security contributions, etc.) and al-
lowed production costs to rise enormously due to the many ad-
ditional regulations with social or environmental intent.
Wage policies as well have contributed to the increased cost
pressure in corporations. This is because unions and employ-
ers
1 association as a rule orient themselves in wage negotia-
tions towards the development of artifically increased overall
entrepreneurial profits. As has been shown, these profits
stemmed less and less from actual production activity itself
in recent years, but instead were generated predominantly
through income from financial investments and from holdings.- 22 -
The wage rounds have thus taken more and more the character of
struggles between active partners of investment trust compa-
nies and self-appointed silent partners, who negotiate on the
distribution of profits from holdings and from the possession
of financial assets ("rentier income"). This had severe conse-
quences for employment, since the wage settlements led, be-
cause of the considerably lower returns in production itself,
to a persistently high or even rising cost pressure. The re-
sult was not only that more and more jobs were destroyed in
the original area of activity of the company - i. e. in pro-
duction - through rationalization measures, plant closures or
even bankruptcies, the result was also that the readiness of
corporations to invest in additional production capacities has
decreased significantly.
It follows from all this that the preconditions for a revita-
lization of domestic investment activity are not so much lower
real rates of interest but rather, and this above all, im-
proved returns on fixed capital. That under such circumstances
investment in new production capacities and products can be
brisk even in times of high real rates of interest has been
shown in Japan and in the USA. In 1979/80 Japanese trade
unions accepted a decline of real wages by about 15 percent in
order to compensate for the sharp price increases of imported
raw materials (including oil). Thus, a deterioration of
profits from production activities and a decline of employ-
ment, like the one after the first oil price hike, could be
avoided in Japan. In the USA, real wages exhibited greater
flexibility than in Germany or many other European countries
due to a larger share of wage contracts on a company basis.
In addition, the government promoted growth and employment by
reducing taxes substantially, improving depreciation allowanc-
es and abolishing regulations in many areas. Giersch [1984]
estimates that in restoring the incentives for economic growth
the USA have a lead of about half a decade over Europe. The
investment boom and the strength of the US-dollar indicate,- 23 -
that the government succeeded in making it more attractive to
put money in fixed assets than in government bonds. These
examples demonstrate that progress in promoting growth and
fighting unemployment will only be made in Germany if economic
policy and wage policy give up their attempt to preserve
present production and employment structures by additional
interventions and regulations. Instead it is necessary to
accept more flexibility with respect to income and prices, to
get rid of legal barriers making investments unprofitable, and
to support those who are economically successful and not to
punish them by additional taxes or withdrawal of benefits.- 24 -
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